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An Essay on Miranda’s Fortieth Birthday
By Paul Shechtman*
Miranda v. Arizona1 has now reached its fortieth birthday,
and it has grown in stature with age. After Dickerson v. United
States,2 Miranda is clearly a “constitutional decision.” Forty
years later, however, basic questions about Miranda’s effect remain hotly debated: Does Miranda frustrate effective law enforcement by shielding the guilty from custodial interrogations?
Does it protect the innocent from false confessions and wrongful
convictions? Should its warnings be modified to better serve
their intended purpose? If not, what other measures should be
considered if one believes, as I do, that police interrogation requires additional regulation? This essay, which grows out of my
presentation at the Chapman Law Review Miranda symposium,
addresses those questions.
I.
As others have observed, there is a paucity of useful empirical analysis of Miranda’s effect on police interrogation.3 In the
immediate aftermath of the decision, there was a flurry of research, but most scholars agree that the studies are flawed.4
Principal among the shortcomings was a failure to appreciate
that the police would adapt to Miranda with time. As a result,
the early studies do not provide a reliable basis for drawing longterm conclusions.
* Paul Shechtman is a partner at Stillman, Friedman & Shechtman, P.C. and an
Adjunct Professor at Columbia University Law School, where he teaches Evidence and
Criminal Procedure.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
3 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055,
1058 (1998) (“In what has aptly been described as an ‘empirical desert,’ we have little
knowledge about what police interrogation looked like shortly after Miranda, much less
what it looks like today.” (citing H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW
PROFESSOR’S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 198 (1988)));
George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better)
Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996).
4 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 631–52 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 506–41
(1996).
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Since those early years, there have been only two studies of
note, both published in 1996: one by Professor Leo conducted in
the Bay Area5 and the other by Professor (now Judge) Cassell
and his student, Bret Hayman, conducted in Salt Lake County.6
Those studies are notable because in each, approximately 80% of
arrestees who received Miranda warnings elected to waive their
rights and face questioning.7 And in each, less than 5% of those
who initially waived later reconsidered and invoked.8 Two studies is a small sample from which to generalize, but it is all we
have; hence, those numbers—80% waive, and few subsequently
invoke—are treated as revealed truths in the Miranda literature.
If those numbers are accurate, the first obvious question is,
why do so many arrestees agree to talk? The principal reason, no
doubt, is that arrestees want to talk: the innocent want to explain their innocence, and the guilty want to minimize their culpability. (Often, an arrestee does not appreciate the extent to
which he has incriminated himself, as when he admits to a robbery but denies pulling the trigger, only to be charged with felony
murder.) Many arrestees are loath to remain silent lest the police draw an adverse inference against them. Some waive their
rights in order to learn what the police know about the crime.
They recognize that the police are unlikely to talk to them unless
they talk to the police.9
Another reason that so relatively few arrestees invoke is that
the Miranda warnings are ineffectual. In part that is because
the police have learned to give the warnings in a way that masks
their import. They have learned to “waltz around Miranda,” to
use the words of a detective whom Professor Leo interviewed.10 A
revealing example is the recent decision in Hairston v. United
States,11 in which the defendant, an 18-year-old, was arrested for
a gang-related murder. The arrest occurred at approximately
10:00 p.m., and the lead detective gave the arresting officer express instructions not to administer Miranda warnings. Instead,
the defendant was placed in an interview room and left there
alone for more than an hour. When the lead detective finally en5

(1996).

Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266

6 Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996).
7 Leo, supra note 5, at 276; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6, at 859–60.
8 Leo, supra note 5, at 275; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6, at 860.
9 For insight into the diverse factors that motivate arrestees to talk, see Anemona
Hartocollis, Remain Silent? Some in Custody Spell it All Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007.
10 Leo, supra note 4, at 665; see also Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to
Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by
Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 431–47 (1999).
11 Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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tered the room, he launched into a lengthy speech. He announced that he knew the defendant was involved in the crime,
named others who supposedly also participated, and informed
the defendant that another gang member had already confessed.
All the while, the detective admonished the defendant to “listen
and not talk.”12
When the defendant first spoke, it was to express his disbelief that his fellow gang member was cooperating. The detective
countered by showing the defendant a videotape of the other
gang member talking to the police. The videotape was played for
one minute with the volume off so that the defendant could only
guess at what his confederate was saying. It was at that point,
almost an hour into the session, that the detective asked the defendant if he wanted to tell “his side of the story.” When the defendant answered “yes,” the detective administered the Miranda
warnings. Three hours later, he had elicited a confession to the
crime.13 That the detective’s stratagem was found to comport
with Miranda, which it was, speaks volumes about our willingness to tolerate “waltzing.”
The answer to the second obvious question—why do so few
arrestees who initially waive subsequently invoke?—can be found
in a brilliant article by Professor Stuntz, who calls such persons
“conditional talkers.”14 As Professor Stuntz observes, conditional
talkers are optimistic that they can talk their way out of trouble,
seemingly ignorant of the fact that talking to the police is a perilous course, fearful of angering the police by initially invoking,
courageous enough to say “stop” in mid-stream, and sophisticated
enough to realize that if they say “stop,” the police will presumably accede to their request. That so few people share that mix of
traits—in Professor Stuntz’s words, “ignorant and knowledgeable, fearful and courageous, irrationally optimistic and unusually sophisticated”—should not be surprising.15
One other fact helps explain why there are so few conditional
talkers. Increased police professionalism, to which Miranda has
contributed, has meant that interrogation tactics are less abusive, so that the need to say “stop” is less pressing. A little-noted
aspect of the Leo and Cassell-Hayman studies is the brevity of
the observed interrogations: 92% of the interrogations Leo observed lasted two hours or less and all but one of the interrogations that Cassell and Hayman studied lasted one hour or less.16
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 770–71.
Id. at 772.
William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 983 (2001).
Id. at 986–87.
Leo, supra note 5, at 279; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6, at 892.
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An arrestee is less likely to invoke mid-stream when the stream
is so short.
II.
The goal of confession law should be to regulate the interrogation process so as to maximize the number of arrestees who
talk and to minimize abusive interrogations. To borrow Justice
Harlan’s words, “[P]eaceful interrogation is not one of the dark
moments of the law.”17 Indeed, if the available data is correct,
more than 50% of all interrogations yield incriminating evidence.18 For me, what drove the point home was an assignment
as a consultant to the District Attorney’s Office in pre-Katrina
New Orleans, where the police had all but stopped questioning
arrestees, even in homicide cases. The result was homicide
prosecutions that relied exclusively on the testimony of eyewitnesses and accomplices. Not surprisingly, intimidation of witnesses was rampant, and acquittals were common. One can debate whether confessions are good for the soul, but they are
plainly good for the prosecution.
How does Miranda fare when judged against the goal of
maximizing non-abusive interrogations? I will focus here on
Miranda’s costs. One cost is that some guilty defendants who
might otherwise talk invoke their right to silence. Estimating
their number is a parlous task. If 20% of arrestees invoke their
Miranda rights and 50% of interrogations are successful, incriminating statements would be lost in 10% of cases. That
number, however, is high because some of those who invoke
would remain silent even if Miranda were overruled. (Among
those who invoke are a disproportionate number of recidivists
who apparently have learned that silence is golden.)19 Professor
Schulhofer may well be close to the mark when he estimates that
Miranda prevents the police from obtaining incriminating statements in approximately 5% of cases.20 That is a small percentage, but it is a significant number in the aggregate (there were
603,503 arrests in 2005 for violent crimes21), so that Miranda’s
cost in lost evidence should not be lightly dismissed.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Leo, supra note 5, at 280–81 (noting that older studies had success rates of approximately 50%, and suggesting success in as high as two-thirds of interrogations); see
generally George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk about the Miranda Empirical Debate: A
“Steady-State” Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933 (1996).
19 Leo, supra note 5, at 286–87.
20 Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 545–46.
21 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE U.S. 2005
tbl.29 (2006), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_29.html (classifying murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault as violent crimes).
17
18
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Miranda imposes other costs on the criminal justice system
as well. We lose some voluntary confessions because of technical
non-compliance with Miranda, but the number seems small.22
What bears emphasis is that any exclusion of reliable evidence on
a perceived “technicality” breeds disrespect for the law. Take, for
example, the recent case of United States v. Street, in which the
defendant was a police officer with twenty-two years on the job
who moonlighted as a bank robber.23 His voluntary confession
was suppressed because he was given only two of the four warnings.24 Bright line rules must be enforced, but no one should be
pleased with the result in Street, which flouts common sense.
Another cost of Miranda is a proliferation of hearings. Even
if the prosecution “wins,” the criminal justice system loses when
scarce resources are devoted to pre-trial proceedings. The sad
reality is that the adjudicative process has become so costly that
we plea bargain virtually all criminal cases.25 Trials have all but
vanished. Miranda contributes to that reality, which its admirers too often forget.
Miranda’s greatest cost, however, may be that it has stifled
further effort to regulate police interrogation. Miranda warnings, it seems, share a common feature with the warnings on the
boxes of commercial products. Just as those warnings have
shielded manufacturers from liability, Miranda warnings have
shielded police interrogations from closer scrutiny. If the warnings are given, courts are less likely to look “inside the box” to see
whether the police have employed dubious tactics. As the Supreme Court itself has observed, “The requirement that Miranda
warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry. But as we said in Berkemer v. McCarty, ‘[c]ases
in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a selfincriminating statement was “compelled” despite the fact that
the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of
Miranda are rare.’”26
What we know is that Miranda has not eliminated false confessions. Professors Drizin and Leo have documented 125 proven
22 See George C. Thomas III, Stories about Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1976
(2004) (describing studies which show that “police have adjusted to the rule that they
must warn suspects before beginning custodial interrogation”).
23 United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2006).
24 Id. at 1304, 1312–14.
25 Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 137 (2005) (“[P]lea bargains resolve ninety-five percent of adjudicated cases.”); see
also the classic article by John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 3 (1978).
26 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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cases of false confessions since Miranda was announced.27 DNA
exonerations have given prominence to the issue. If we believe
125 false confessions is an unacceptable number, as we must,
then reforms that go beyond Miranda are required.
III.
Three reforms commend themselves.
1. Videotaping. A fundamental flaw of Miranda is that it
does nothing to eliminate the swearing contest between the police and the arrestee that plagued courts in the pre-Miranda
years. It is still commonplace for a judge (or jury) to be faced
with strikingly different accounts of what occurred behind closed
doors. In recent years, numerous jurisdictions have mandated
videotaping to varying extents,28 and efforts should be made to
study the effect. Does videotaping reduce the number of custodial interrogations? Do the police circumvent the rules by conducting more pre-custody interviews? Does videotaping spawn
litigation about what happened before the camera was turned
on? One recent study reports promising results.29 Surely any reform that both Professor Leo and Judge Cassell support (given
their otherwise divergent views) deserves our careful consideration.
2. Expert testimony. Juries, we now know, are not skilled at
recognizing false confessions. In the 35 false confession cases in
the Drizin-Leo study that went to trial before a jury, the jury acquitted in 7 and convicted in 28.30 That percentage reflects the
fact that most jurors believe that an innocent person would not
confess to a crime. Expert testimony can help dispel that canard.
The leading case is United States v. Hall,31 in which the court
27 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the PostDNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004).
28 See Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 528–29 (identifying jurisdictions that have required electronic recording); Cathy Young, Miranda Morass, REASON,
Apr. 2000, at 54, 56 (“[A]t least 2,400 police and sheriffs’ departments nationwide (about
15 percent of the total) audiotape or videotape . . . interrogations . . . .”).
29 See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, NORTHWESTERN SCH. OF LAW, CTR. FOR WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 6, 24–
26 (2004), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/documents/
SullivanReport.pdf.
30 Drizin & Leo, supra note 27, at 953. Fourteen of 125 false confessors pleaded
guilty and two were convicted by a judge; the other seventy-four were never charged or
the charges were dropped pre-trial.
31 United States v. Hall (Hall I), 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (remanding for a
Daubert hearing); United States v. Hall (Hall II), 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (admitting expert testimony on remand); United States v. Hall (Hall III), 165 F.3d 1095 (7th
Cir. 1999) (affirming convictions); see generally Nadia Soree, Comment, When the Innocent Speak: False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards, and the Role of Expert Testi-
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found that such testimony would be helpful to the jury and that
it passed muster under Daubert. (The expert was allowed to testify that there are false confessions and to the factors that seem
to produce them, but not that the defendant’s confession was
false.)32 It bears note that Hall was convicted despite the expert’s
testimony—an outcome which should allay the fears of some
prosecutors that expert testimony about false confession is a recipe for false acquittals.
3. Length Restrictions. One of the lessons from Miranda literature is that protracted interrogations can yield false confessions. In 84% of the cases in the Drizin-Leo study for which the
length of interrogation could be determined, questioning lasted
more than six hours. Several interrogations lasted more than a
day.33 A rule limiting questioning to four hours with the ability
to seek additional time from a judge in exceptional circumstances
would seem desirable.34 I would not require the police to advise
arrestees of the four-hour rule: what matters is not that arrestees
know the limit but that there be one.35
IV.
There have been proposals to strengthen the Miranda warnings to address the false confession problem. One proposal calls
for adding the admonition that a suspect’s silence cannot be used
against him.36 For me, the proposal misses the mark. An added
warning might have the unwanted effect of increasing the number of arrestees who invoke. And it is unlikely to prevent false
confessions from occurring. As noted above, false confessions are
often the product of lengthy interrogations, and those who confess falsely are often young or mentally defective.37 A refined
warning would do precious little to prevent them from talking.
Miranda is now forty years old, and, after Dickerson, its fiftimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191 (2005).
32 Hall II, 974 F. Supp. at 1205.
33 Drizin & Leo, supra note 27, at 948–49.
34 Notably, a leading manual on police interrogation indicates that four hours is generally sufficient to obtain a confession. Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitutional Safeguards against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105,
145 (1997) (citing FRED E. INBAU, ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 310
(3d ed. 1986)).
35 Compare id. at 144 (arguing that “interrogators should be required at the outset to
inform a suspect as to the maximum permissible length of the questioning”).
36 Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 813 (2006).
37 Drizin & Leo, supra note 27, at 948–49; Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219,
308 (2006) (“By contrast, prolonged interrogation—especially in conjunction with youthfulness, mental retardation, or other psychological vulnerabilities—is strongly associated
with eliciting false confessions.”).

655-662 SHECHTMAN.DOC

662

9/18/2007 7:02:13 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:655

eth birthday (and well beyond) seems assured. It is now a fixture
on the criminal justice landscape. That said, we should not look
to Miranda as a solution to the false confession problem. Videotaping, expert testimony, and length restrictions should be promoted in upcoming years. Their effect should be examined at the
next Chapman Miranda symposium, say in 2017.

